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Equal Protection: Immigrants' Access to
Healthcare and Welfare Benefits
DR. MEL COUSINS*
The adoption of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (hereinafter "PRWORA") led to
considerable litigation over immigrants' rights to welfare benefits and
access to health care.' The approaches adopted by different courts
(both federal and state) diverged significantly based on the various
statutory schemes involved as well as distinct approaches to equal
protection. However, no "on point" cases have reached the United
States Supreme Court, so the "correct" approach remains unclear.
Following the fiscal crisis of 2008, several states moved for
increased exclusion of certain immigrants, residing in the country
legally, from state healthcare or welfare schemes. Decisions
regarding such increased exclusion are currently under challenge in
both the federal and state courts, including Connecticut, Hawai'i,
* Dr. Mel Cousins is attached to the School of Social Work and Social Policy at
Trinity College Dublin, and is involved in a range of ongoing social policy research at
national and international levels. He is also a qualified barrister-at-law at the King's Inn,
Dublin and has a Ph.D. from Glasglow Caledonian University. He has worked as a
social policy advisor to a wide range of organizations, including the European
Commission, the World Health Bank, AusAID, and UN agencies in several countries. He
has written extensively on social security and social policy issues from both a legal and
policy perspective.
1. See Alvarino v. Wing 690 N.Y.S.2d 262 (App. Div. 1999); Cid v. S.D. Dep't of Soc.
Servs., 598 N.W.2d 887 (S.D. 1999); see also Aliessa ex rel. Fayad v. Novello, % N.Y.2d 418
(2001); see also Kurti v. Maricopa Cnty., 33 P.3d 499 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001); see also Doe v.
Comm'r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404 (Mass. 2002); Teytelman v. Wing, 773
N.Y.S.2d 801 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Avila v. Biedess, 78 P.3d 280 (Ariz. 2003); see also Soskin v.
Reinertson, 353 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d 1220 (Md. 2006);
see also Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70 (N.Y. 2009). The cases here focus here on equal
protection issues arising under both federal and state constitutions. In a number of cases
additional arguments were made in relation to specific state constitutional provisions, but
these are not discussed in this Article.
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Maine, Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Washington.2  Such
challenges are now in front of the Courts of Appeals in both the First
and Ninth Circuits.
In the past, courts have come to very different conclusions as to
the issues involved. On the one hand, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court has held that strict scrutiny applies to the exclusion of
immigrants from a state healthcare scheme (with federal funding)
and that the law under challenge did not satisfy that requirement.
3
On the other, the Connecticut Supreme Court has held that a
decision to abolish a state healthcare scheme for immigrants not
entitled under the state-federal Medicaid scheme did not involve
any discrimination, because no comparable citizen was being
provided with state benefits.4
This Article discusses recent cases and analyzes potential
resolutions of such issues consistent with equal protection law. Part
I outlines the legal context, including the relevant Supreme Court
case law and the provisions of PRWORA. Part II briefly outlines the
facts and outcomes of four of the most significant cases, which
highlights the differing approaches adopted by the courts. Part III
sets out an analytical approach to the issues; and Part IV summarizes
the findings and conclusions set forth in this Article.
2. See Hong Pham v. Starkowski, 16 A.3d 635 (Conn. 2011); see also Finch v.
Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I1), 959 N.E.2d 970 (Mass. 2012); see also
Pimentel v. Dreyfus, 670 F.3d 1096 (9th. Cir. 2012); see also Korab v. Koller (Korab I), No. 10-
00483, WL 4688824 (D. Haw. Nov. 10, 2010); see also Korab v. Koller (Korab II), No. 10-00483,
WL 5158883 (D. Haw. Dec. 13, 2010); see also Korab v. McManaman (Korab II1), 805 F. Supp.
2d 1027 (D. Haw. 2011); Korab v Fink (Korab IV), 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014); see also
Guaman v. Velez, 74 A.3d 931 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013); see also Unthaksinkun v.
Porter, No. C11-0588JLR, WL 4502050 (W.D. Wash. Sep. 28, 2011) (order granting in part
and denying in part motion for preliminary injunction); see also Bruns v. Mayhew, 750 F.3d
61 (1st Cir. 2014).
3. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 959 N.E.2d 970
(Mass. 2012).
4. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 646; see also Pimentel, 670 F.3d 1096; see also Bruns v
Mayhew, 750 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2014).
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I. Immigrants' Access to Welfare and Equal Protection
A. Legal Context
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution provides that " [n]o State shall deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
5
The framework for equal protection analysis is laid out in many
Supreme Court decisions. To prevail on an equal protection claim, a
plaintiff first must establish that the State affords different treatment
to similarly situated groups of individuals. Second, where different
treatment is demonstrated, the court must examine whether such
treatment is consistent with a governmental interest. The Supreme
Court developed a three-tiered approach to examine all such
legislative classifications. Under the first tier of scrutiny, known as
the rational relationship test or rational basis review, the
classification must be reasonably related to a legitimate government
interest. The second tier of scrutiny applied by the court to review
legislative classifications is known as heightened, or intermediate,
scrutiny,6 but applies only in a very limited number of cases (e.g.,
gender) and is not generally relevant in immigration cases. Finally,
in the highest level of scrutiny, known as strict scrutiny, the courts
will strike down any legislative classification that is not necessary to
fulfill a compelling or overriding government objective. Most
(though by no means all) legislation reviewed under strict scrutiny
by the federal courts is invalidated, because very few classifications
are necessary to support a compelling government objective. 7
The general legal context for the consideration of equal
protection claims concerning legally authorized immigrants and
social security is reasonably clear. First, strict scrutiny applies to
State action in relation to immigrants. 8 In Graham v Richardson, a
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The term "person" in the context of the Fourteenth
Amendment includes lawfully admitted resident immigrants, as well as citizens of the
United States, and entitles both citizens and immigrants to the equal protection of the
laws of the state in which they reside.
6. The classification must be substantially related to an important governmental interest.
7. See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006).
8. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). Subsequent and prior to PRWORA,
state courts applied strict scrutiny to State statutes determining eligibility for welfare
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unanimous Supreme Court ruled that some state statutes were in
breach of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
and also encroached upon the exclusive federal power over the
entrance and residence of immigrants. 9 The aforementioned statutes
included those of Arizona and Pennsylvania, which denied welfare
benefits to resident undocumented immigrants or to immigrants
who had not resided in the United States for a specified number of
years.10
Second, because Congress has broad power over immigration
and naturalization issues, only rational basis review applies to federal
action in relation to immigration status.11 In Mathews v. Diaz, the
Court (again unanimously) rejected a challenge to federal Medicare
legislation, which denied eligibility to immigrants unless they had
benefits on the basis of alienage (at least as regard immigrants with legal status) and struck
down such statutes that did not meet that standard. See e.g., El Souri v. Dep't of Soc.
Serv., 414 N.W.2d 679 (Mich. 1987); see also Barannikova v. Greenwich, 643 A.2d 251 (Conn.
1994); see also Matter of Dallas v. Lavine, 358 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (finding for
plaintiff on grounds other than immigration status). Although all immigrants are entitled
to equal protection, undocumented immigrants are not entitled to strict scrutiny. See e.g.,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). For the post-PRWORA position concerning such
immigrants see Elizabeth R. Chesler, Note, Denying Undocumented Immigrants Access to
Medicaid: A Denial of Their Equal Protection Rights?, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 255 (2008).
9. Graham, 403 U.S. at 376, 382-83.
10. Id. at 367-70. Presumably as PRWORA has specifically authorized states to
treat immigrants differently, recent challenges have not relied on the Supremacy
Clause aspect of Graham.
11. Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 77-87 (1976). Exclusion of immigrants has
subsequently been routinely upheld under rational basis review. See Abreu v. Callahan,
971 F. Supp. 799 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Kiev v. Glickman, 991 F. Supp. 1090 (D. Minn. 1998);
Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez v. United States, 169 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1999); City of Chicago
v. Shalala, 189 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 1999). One of the very rare successful challenges was Lewis
v. Grinker, 111 F. Supp. 2d 142, 179-80 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (applying the heightened scrutiny
standard of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982) to hold that the denial of prenatal care to
unqualified aliens was an unconstitutional denial of their citizen children's 5th amendment
equal protection). However, this was largely overturned on appeal in Lewis v. Thompson,
252 F.3d 567, 583-84 (2nd Cir. 2001) (applying heightened scrutiny in finding that although
citizen children of unqualified immigrants must be accorded automatic eligibility to
Medicaid on terms as favorable as those available to children of citizen mothers). See also
David J. Deterding, Note, A Deference-Based Dilemma: The Implications of Lewis v. Thompson
for Access to Non-Emergency Health Benefits for Undocumented Alien Children, 52 ST. Louis U.
L.J. 951 (2008) and Michael E. Kenney, Note, A Pitfall of Judicial Deference: Equal Protection of
the Laws Fails Women in Lewis v. Thompson, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 52 (2002). See also Aleman v.
Glickman, 217 F.3d 1191, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000) (concluding that, in determining a resident
immigrant's eligibility for food stamps, PRWORA did not irrationally differentiate between
marriages that end in divorce and those that end in death).
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been admitted for permanent residence and also resided in the United
States for at least five years.
Third, under what is known as the "uniform-rule doctrine,"
state discrimination is subject only to rational basis review when a
state's action merely implements a uniform federal rule that
discriminates on the basis of their immigration status.12 However,
the Supreme Court has yet to clarify what qualifies as a "uniform
rule" and consideration of this issue in the lower courts is limited.'
3
In Graham, the Supreme Court stated that:
Congress does not have the power to authorize the individual
States to violate the Equal Protection Clause. Under Art. I, s 8,
cl. 4, of the Constitution, Congress' power is to 'establish an
uniform Rule of Naturalization.' A congressional enactment
construed so as to permit state legislatures to adopt divergent
laws on the subject of citizenship requirements for federally
supported welfare programs would appear to contravene this
explicit constitutional requirement of uniformity.
14
Some interpret this to mean that Congress cannot authorize the
states to adopt different positions regarding to access to welfare,
suggesting that the provisions of PRWORA might be
unconstitutional.'5 However, leaving aside the fact that the statement
was in dicta, as the Third Circuit pointed out in Soskin v. Reinertson, the
basic proposition is "almost tautological." 6 Congress, of course, cannot
authorize states to breach the Constitution, and the Supreme Court
12. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (stating "if the Federal Government has by uniform
rule prescribed what it believes to be appropriate standards for the treatment of an alien
subclass, the States may, of course, follow the federal direction").
13. For consideration of whether the "uniform rule" applied in the welfare context
pre-PRWORA see Sudomir v. McMahon, 767 F.2d 1456 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that that
the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program, which "require[d] states not only
to grant benefits to eligible aliens but also to deny benefits to aliens who do not satisfy the
[legal requirement], had created a uniform eligibility rule"). The more recent case law is
discussed below. See also Monmouth Med. Ctr. v. Hau Kwok, 444 A.2d 610 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1982).
14. Graham, 403 U.S. at 382 (citing Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969)).
15. See Aliessa ex rel. Fayad, 754 N.E.2d 1085,1097 (N.Y. 2001); see also Karin H. Berg,
May Congress Grant the States the Power to Violate the Equal Protection Clause? Aliessa v.
Novello and Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996, 17 BYU. J. PUB. L. 297 (2003).
16. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1254.
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applied this principle in Saenz v. Roe.17 However, given Congress'
plenary power in relation to immigration issues,18 there is nothing to
suggest that Congress cannot authorize the states to treat immigrants
differently regarding their access to welfare benefits, so long as such
treatment is not inconsistent with a uniform rule of naturalization.
B. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act
In principle the governing legal position seems reasonably clear.
However, the adoption of PRWORA 19 considerably complicated the
position. In PRWORA Congress made the following "statements
concerning national policy with respect to welfare and
immigration:"
(1) Self-sufficiency has been a basic principle of United
States immigration law since this country's earliest
immigration statutes.
(2) It continues to be the immigration policy of the United
States that:
(a) aliens within the Nation's borders not depend on public
resources to meet their needs, but rather rely on their own
capabilities and the resources of their families, their
sponsors, and private organizations, and
(b) the availability of public benefits not constitute an
incentive for immigration to the United States.
(3) Despite the principle of self-sufficiency, aliens have been
applying for and receiving public benefits from Federal,
State, and local governments at increasing rates.
(4) Current eligibility rules for public assistance and
unenforceable financial support agreements have proven
wholly incapable of assuring that individual aliens do not
burden the public benefits system.
(5) It is a compelling governmental interest to enact new
17. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 507 (1999) (using footnote 21 to similarly cite to
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)).
18. Sudomir, 767 F.2d at 1466 (9th Cir. 1985).
19. For ease of reference, the legislation is referred to as PRWORA although some of
the current consolidated provisions were added in separate legislation.
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rules for eligibility and sponsorship agreements in order to
assure that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national
immigration policy.
(6) It is a compelling governmental interest to remove the
incentive for illegal immigration provided by the
availability of public benefits.
(7) With respect to the State authority to make
determinations concerning the eligibility of qualified aliens
for public benefits in this chapter, a State that chooses to
follow the Federal classification in determining the
eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be
considered to have chosen the least restrictive means
available for achieving the compelling governmental
interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance
with national immigration policy.
20
In brief, and there are considerable exceptions, PRWORA divides
immigrants into two classes: qualified and unqualified.21 "Qualified
aliens" are generally those lawfully admitted to the United States for
permanent residence and those admitted pursuant to certain statutes.
22
Any immigrant not considered to be a "qualified alien" is a
"nonqualified alien," which includes undocumented immigrants.23
"Nonqualified aliens" are ineligible for federal public assistance,
including, with certain exceptions, federal Medicaid benefits.
24
Their length of residency in the United States further divides
"qualified aliens." Any "qualified alien" who has resided in the
United States for five or more years is eligible for federal public
assistance.25 Immigrants who have resided in the United States for
fewer than five years are generally ineligible for receipt of federal
public assistance (hereinafter referred to as "ineligible immigrants").
26
Federal law thus requires states deny federal Medicaid coverage to
otherwise "qualified aliens" who are barred from participating by the
20. 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (1996).
21. 8 U.S.C. § 1641(b) (2008) (defining "qualified alien").
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. 8 U.S.C. § 1611(a)-(b) (1998).
25. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2003).
26. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a) (2003); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1613(b) (2003) (providing exceptions
to five-year rule).
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five-year rule.27
PRWORA specifically provides that "a State is authorized to
determine the eligibility for any State public benefits of an alien who
is a qualified alien."28 However, PRWORA goes on to provide that
"a State or political subdivision of a State is authorized to prohibit or
otherwise limit or restrict the eligibility of aliens or classes of aliens
for programs of general cash public assistance furnished under the
law of the State or a political subdivision of a State." 29
Therefore, and critically for the purpose of this Article, PRWORA
has barred certain groups of immigrants from entitlement to federal
welfare. Additionally, while authorizing states to determine
eligibility of authorized immigrants for state benefits, PRWORA has
permitted states to bar or otherwise restrict entitlement to state
benefits to immigrants up to the same extent that federal benefits are
so limited. PRWORA's impact is demonstrated by states that acted on
the limitations authorized in the statute30 leading to a 'first wave' of
litigation.31 These cases led to a very divided outcome amongst the
courts. For example, some courts ruled that no equal protection
27. 8 U.S.C. § 1613(a).
28. 8 U.S.C. § 1622(a) (1997) (emphasis added).
29. 8 U.S.C. § 1624(a) (1996); see also § 1624(b) (requiring that any prohibitions,
limitations, or restrictions imposed by a state or political subdivision of a state must not be
more restrictive than the prohibitions, limitations, or restrictions imposed under
comparable federal programs).
30. See Wendy Zimmermann & Karen C. Tumlin, Patchwork Policies: State
Assistance for Immigrants Under Welfare Reform, URBAN INSTITUTE (1999) (discussing state
responses); see also Julia Field Costich, Legislating a Public Health Nightmare: The Anti-
immigrant Provisions of the "Contract With America" Congress, 90 KY. L.J. 1043 (2002)
(analyzing the impact).
31. See supra Introduction and note 1; see generally Matthew E. Price, Note, The
Constitutionality of Immigration Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2247 (2005); see also Howard F.
Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage Discrimination by the States, 58
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357 (2002); see also Ellen M. Yacknin, Aliessa and Equal Protection
for Immigrants, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 391 (2002); see also Karin H. Berg, Note, May
Congress Grant the States the Power to Violate the Equal Protection Clause? Aliessa v. Novello
and Title IV of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, 17
B.Y.U. J. PUB. L. 297 (2003); see also Michael Shapland, Soskin v. Reinertson: An Analysis of
the Tenth Circuit's Decision to Permit the State of Colorado to Withhold Medicaid Benefits from
Aliens Pursuant to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, 2 SErON
HALL CIRCUIT REV. 339 (2005); see also Anna C. Tavis, Note, Healthcarefor All: Ensuring States
Comply with the Equal Protection Rights of Legal Immigrants, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1627 (2010); see also
Recent Case, Constitutional Law - Equal Protection - New York Court of Appeals Holds That
State May Restrict Legal Alien Access To Disability Benefits. - Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 909
N.E.2D 70 (N.Y. 2009), 123 HARV. L. REV. 800 (2010).
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violation took place because there was no comparable class in receipt
of benefits; 32 other courts ruled that rational basis review applied as
the state laws "reflect national policy that Congress has the
constitutional power to enact"33 while others applied strict scrutiny on
the basis that immigration status was involved. 34 The fiscal crisis of
2008 subsequently led to further state action within a number of
states. These states, which previously provided benefits to qualified
but ineligible immigrants, moved to restrict entitlement. This led to
the current wave of litigation.
II. Recent and Ongoing Cases
As noted in the introduction of this Article, there has been
litigation involving at least six states concerning the welfare rights of
immigrants. The facts and findings of four of the more important of
these cases are briefly set out using a broadly standard approach.
Analysis of these decisions is reserved for Part III below.
A. Hong Pham35
1. The Scheme at Issue
The case of Hong Pham concerned a challenge by qualified but
ineligible immigrants to the termination of certain state-funded
medical assistance under the Connecticut state medical assistance for
noncitizens program (hereinafter "SMANC").36 In 1997 and in
response to PRWORA, Connecticut, created SMANC; a state-funded
program that afforded medical coverage exclusively to qualified
immigrants who otherwise were categorically eligible for federal
Medicaid, but were barred from participating in federal Medicaid
32. Khrapunskiy v. Doar, 909 N.E.2d 70, 77 (2009).
33. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255.
34. See Aliessa ex rel. Fayad, 754 N.E.2d at 1094; see also Ehrlich v. Perez, 908 A.2d
1220 (Md. 2006).
35. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d 635; see also Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1106 (adopting an approach
similar to the Connecticut Supreme Court's in Hong Pham and concluded that "strict
scrutiny was not merited in these circumstances because Pimentel has not pointed to
similarly situated individuals who have been treated differently by the State."); see also
Bruns, 70 F.3d at 70 (holding that the appellants were not similarly situated).
36. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 637-39.
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due to the federal five year rule.37 However, in response to budget
concerns in 2009, the legislature substantially eliminated SMANC
and effectively terminated publicly funded medical assistance for
most recipients.3s
2. Equality Analysis
The defendants, conflating the issues of situation and
differential treatment, argued that the termination of SMANC did
not discriminate against immigrants in favor of similarly situated
citizens because only noncitizen immigrants and not citizens, were
ever eligible for SMANC.39 The Connecticut Supreme Court agreed,
concluding that, in substantially eliminating SMANC, the State did
not draw a classification on the basis of immigrants because that
program did not benefit citizens as opposed to noncitizen
immigrants.40 The court referenced the fact that the United States
Supreme Court had previously found that discrimination based on
immigration status in state programs that favored citizens over
noncitizen immigrants on the basis of an individual's citizenship
status.41 In contrast, the court here concluded that:
Because only aliens, and not citizens, ever have benefited
from SMANC, and because no citizens presently receive
assistance under the program, the state is not providing a
benefit to citizens that it is withholding from the class
members and is not treating aliens disparately as compared
to citizens. We therefore conclude that [the law challenged]
does not discriminate against aliens in favor of similarly
situated citizens and, therefore, does not create a
classification based on alienage.
42
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the State
provided a benefit to citizens that it did not provide to certain
37. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 638-39.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 643.
40. Id. at 644.
41. Id. at 646.
42. Id. at 648-49 (citation omitted).
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immigrants insofar as the State continued to participate in federal
Medicaid, which provided assistance to citizens. 43 First, the court
concluded that this argument improperly compared the treatment of
immigrants within a program funded and administered exclusively
by the State to the treatment of citizens within a separate, federal-
state cooperative program governed by federal law and funded in
substantial part by the federal government.44 The court held that:
The equal protection clause requires only that the state treat
individuals in a manner similar to that which the state
treats other similarly situated individuals. Courts
examining claims similar to those advanced in the present
case have held that the equal protection clause does not
require the state to treat individuals in a manner similar to
how others are treated in a different program governed by a
different government.
45
Second, and assuming that one could compare the treatment of
immigrants under SMANC with the treatment of citizens under
Medicaid, the court ruled that any difference in treatment was not
based on alienage. The court characterized the plaintiffs' argument
as such:
[W]hen the federal government rendered the class members
ineligible for federal Medicaid through the passage of the
Welfare Reform Act, the equal protection clause required,
and still requires, the state to provide a level of assistance to
the class members that is equivalent to the level of
assistance that citizens continue to receive under federal
Medicaid. 46
However, the court took the view that:
[T]he state's decision to participate in federal Medicaid does
not draw a classification based on alienage but, instead,
43. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 647.
44. Id. at 646.
45. Id. at 649-50 (citations omitted).
46. Id. at 658.
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draws a classification based on an individual's eligibility for
federal Medicaid. This classification is not based on any
suspect classification such as alienage because it applies to
both aliens and citizens alike, according to the eligibility
requirements established by the federal, rather than state,
government.47
It has not been argued that such classification was irrational
and, therefore, the court ruled that it did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause.48 The court went on to state that:
If the state's decision to cover only those eligible for federal
Medicaid does not violate the equal protection clause, then
the equal protection clause does not require the state to
enact separate, state-only programs to provide an
equivalent level of assistance to those who are ineligible for
federal Medicaid as federal Medicaid provides to those
individuals who are eligible for that program. For this
reason, the equal protection clause did not, and still does
not, require the state to enact the SMANC program or an
equivalent program to fill the void created by the federal
government. If the equal protection clause did not require
the state to enact SMANC, then the state's decision to
eliminate that program or to reduce its scope does not
violate the constitutional rights of those formerly eligible
for assistance under the program because the provision of
public assistance does not establish a right to continue
receiving assistance.49
Therefore, the court rejected the challenge. 50
47. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 659.
48. Id. at 661.
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also id. at 662 (rejecting plaintiff's challenge to the amendments to SAGA-
medical on the basis that the law did not classify on the basis of alienage but on the basis
of an individual's categorical eligibility for federal Medicaid).
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B. Finch l
In Finch v. Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts came to a very different
conclusion on the issues before it. Although the case concerned the
equal protection provisions of the Massachusetts Constitution, these
state constitutional provisions do not appear to apply a higher or
different standard than those found in the Federal Constitution.5 2
1. The Scheme at Issue
Finch concerned an amendment to the Commonwealth Care
Health Insurance Program (hereinafter "Commonwealth Care"),
which is a premium assistance program enacted in 2006.53 Enrollees
in Commonwealth Care "pay a portion of their health insurance
premium based on a sliding scale with the remainder paid by the
defendant Commonwealth Health Insurance Connector Authority."5 4
In response to budgetary concerns, 2009 legislation amended the
scheme to exclude immigrants who were federally ineligible under
PRWORA (who were to be provided with reduced care under an
alternative scheme).55 The scheme is partially funded by federal funds
provided through a Medicaid "demonstration project."56
2. Equality Analysis
The case came to the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
with four questions from the lower county court, which essentially
concerned the level of scrutiny to be applied to the exclusion of
immigrants from Commonwealth Care.5 7 It does not appear to have
51. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch 0, 946 N.E.2d 1262
(Mass. 2011).
52. Reliance on the state constitution appears to have been a tactical one in order to
choose the state rather than federal judicial forum.
53. Finch 1, 946 N.E.2d at 1265.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1267.
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1315 (2010).
57. Finch 1, 946 N.E.2d at 1265-66. One question concerned whether the protection
against discrimination on the basis of "national origin," as enumerated in art. 106 of
the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, include protection against
discrimination on the basis of immigration. The court, perhaps surprisingly, held that it
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been argued that different treatment did not arise (presumably
because of the structure of the Massachusetts scheme, which covered
both citizens and noncitizen immigrants).58 As under federal law,
"[w]here a statute either burdens the exercise of a fundamental right
protected by [the] State Constitution, or discriminates on the basis of
a suspect classification, the statute is subject to strict judicial
scrutiny" under Massachusetts law.59 As the Finch court pointed
out, the standard of review applicable to the statute depended on
whether the federal or state government's actions were under
review.60 The court determined that PRWORA did not require states
to apply federal eligibility requirements "but instead merely declares
that Federal policy will not be thwarted if States decide to
discriminate against qualified aliens." 61 The court concluded:
Where the State is left with a range of options including
discriminatory and nondiscriminatory policies, its selection
amongst those options must be reviewed under the
standards applicable to the State and not those applicable to
Congress. Settled equal protection law therefore requires
that [the challenged law] be reviewed under strict scrutiny.
62
In subsequently considering the application of strict scrutiny to
the law in question, the court concluded that it failed this test.63
Under strict scrutiny, the Attorney General argued that the law did
not violate the equal protection provision of the Massachusetts
Constitution, because it advanced the compelling interest of
furthering the national immigration policies expressed by Congress
did not. Finch 1, 946 N.E.2d at 1272. Contra at 1288-93 (Duffly, J., dissenting).
58. The status of Comm'r of Transitional Assistance is unclear in the light of Finch 1. 773
N.E.2d 404; 946 N.E.2d 1261. In the earlier case, the court ruled that a durational residence
requirement, which only applied to immigrants, involved different treatment on the basis
of residence rather than alienage. The facts in Finch are distinguishable but, while the Finch
court did not overrule Doe, its approach is clearly different and the court did say that the
Doe court "did not bridge the analytical gap between congressional action 'dictating how
States are to regulate and legislate issues relating to aliens' and the State's responsibilities
where Congress enacts a noncompulsory rule and the Commonwealth voluntarily
"adopt[s] those national policies and guidelines." 946 N.E.2d at 1275.
59. Finch 1, 946 N.E.2d at 1273.
60. Id. at 1276.
61. Id. at 1277.
62. Id.
63. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d 970, 984 (Mass. 2012).
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in PRWORA.64 The court rejected this justification for two reasons.
The first being that "in applying the standard of strict scrutiny the
court is required to consider the statute's actual purpose, rather than
relying on a hypothetical justification." 65 Here, the court found that
"exclusively fiscal concerns, which the Commonwealth conceded
[were] not on their own adequate to survive strict scrutiny,
motivated the legislative enactment." 66 Second, the strict scrutiny
doctrine requires a state "to ensure that legislation is narrowly
tailored to further a compelling interest." 67 The court found that the
Commonwealth had not "compl[ied] with those requirements, and
that the policies and findings of fact expressed by Congress in
PRWORA did not furnish a compelling interest for discrimination by
the Commonwealth in its entirely State-run program." 68
C. Guaman69
1. The Scheme at Issue
The case concerned a 2010 decision terminating the enrollment
of certain immigrants residing in the country legally who were
enrolled in the New Jersey FamilyCare Program (hereinafter
"FamilyCare"), "a state-funded Medicaid program offering
subsidized health insurance to qualifying low-income adults and
children." 70 In contrast to some other state Medicaid programs, New
Jersey elected to offer FamilyCare benefits to qualified immigrants
otherwise ineligible for federal Medicaid because of the five-year
bar.71 However, in 2010, in the light of an "unprecedented financial
crisis" the State decided to terminate the enrollment of immigrants
with less than five years lawful residence in the USA and not to
allow such enrollment in the future.72
64. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d at 973-74.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 974.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Guaman v. Velez (Guaman 1, 23 A.3d 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
70. Id. at 456.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 459.
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2. Equality Analysis
In Guaman I, the Superior Court of New Jersey assumed for
purposes of deciding the motion for a preliminary injunction, that the
plaintiffs were members of a class of "similarly situated lawful
immigrant residents of New Jersey who ha[d] suffered, or [would]
suffer, adverse consequences because of the changes to FamilyCare."
Similarly to Finch, the court in Guaman appears to accept that
immigrants were in fact treated differently than citizens.73 Therefore,
the court had to decide whether strict or rational basis scrutiny was
appropriate. The court stated that "[d]etermining whether or not
PRWORA provides a 'uniform rule' is an elusive, and ultimately
unsatisfying, exercise." 74
However, having reviewed the relevant case law, and following
Soskin v. Reinertson,75 the court concluded that rational basis review
should be applied.76 The court stated that "[t]he adoption of the federal
five-year eligibility bar in the state program, while not mandated,
mirrors federal objectives, corresponds to an identifiable congressional
policy, and 'operate[s] harmoniously' within the federal program."77
Concluding that plaintiffs were therefore unlikely to succeed in their
claim, the court refused an injunction.78
The court reached the same conclusion regarding the equal
protection challenge arising under the New Jersey Constitution.
79
New Jersey courts "have rejected the federal three-tier analysis (strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, [and] rational basis), and [instead]
employ a more flexible balancing test that considers three factors: '(1)
the nature of the right asserted; (2) the extent to which the statute
intrudes upon that right; and (3) the public need for the intrusion."'
80
73. Guaman 1, 23 A.3d at 466 (using the phrase "alien subclass").
74. Id.
75. Soskin, 353 F.3d 1242.
76. Guaman 1, 23 A.3d at 468.
77. Guaman I, 23 A.3d at 468 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 226).
78. Guaman I, 23 A.3d at 469.
79. Id. at 468-69 (finding that, although the New Jersey Constitution does not contain
explicit equal protection language, the concept is implicit in article I, section 1, which
provides that "[alll persons are by nature free and independent, and have certain natural
and unalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty,
of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and
happiness." N.J. CONsT. art. I, § 1.).
80. Guaman 1, 23 A.3d at 469.
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However, although the federal and state tests are different, courts
have "weigh[ed] the same factors and often produce the same
result."81 Here, the court concluded that the means selected by the
State for adopting the federal eligibility criteria for immigrants bore a
real and substantial relationship to PRWORA's "compelling
governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-reliant in
accordance with national immigration policy," as well as New Jersey's
interest in providing subsidized health insurance within the limits of
the appropriations as set forth in the enabling act.82 The court
therefore concluded that, even under the more flexible state standard
of review, the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed.
In Guaman 11,83 a majority of the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court of New Jersey followed the approach that the differently
constituted Division adopted on the hearing for a preliminary
injunction.84 The court thus concluded that the State's action was
consistent with both the federal and state constitutions.85 As in the
earlier ruling, the court appeared to assume that the appellants were
similarly situated and treated differently, but held, following Soskin v.
Reinertson,8 6 that this this treatment was subject only to rational review
rather than strict scrutiny and that it satisfied this level of review.8 7 The
court relied largely on its ruling in Guaman 1, but also added some
additional consideration of the "uniform" federal approach.88 The
court noted that Congress had found that "when a state chooses to
follow Congress's lead on this issue, by denying public benefits to legal
aliens who have been in this country less than five years, it is furthering
a very important national immigration policy."
89
The issue, the court said, was "whether this statement of
national policy, viewed pragmatically in light of the overall structure
of Medicaid, is sufficiently 'uniform' to constitutionally authorize
states to follow Congress's policy choice." 90 The court accepted that
81. Soujoumer A. v. N.J. Dep't of Human Servs., 828 A.2d 306, 315 (N.J. 2003).
82. Guaman 1, 23 A.3d at 466 (emphasis removed).
83. Guaman v. Velez (Guaman I/), 74 A.3d 931 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2013).
84. Guaman 11, 74 A.3d at 933.
85. The majority shortly disposed of the arguments under the State constitution. Id.
at 935-36. Contra at 944-59 (Harris, J. dissenting).
86. Soskin, 353 F.3d 1242.
87. Guaman I, 74 A.3d at 935.
88. Id. at 934-35.
89. Id. at 941.
90. Id.
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Congress could have prohibited the states from providing health
benefits to immigrants with legal status, as a matter of national
immigration policy. 91  The question to address was whether
Congress might "create a national immigration policy, one aspect of
which allows the States some leeway in its implementation." 92
The court raised an interesting point, which does not appear to
have been previously considered:
Federal Medicaid law requires the States to provide
emergency healthcare to indigent persons, regardless of
their immigration status or whether they otherwise qualify
for any other form of Medicaid assistance. Because the
Federal Medicaid law requires the States to provide
emergency medical care "to all individuals in need of such
services," cutting Federal Medicaid funding for legal aliens
does not address the State-level fiscal problem posed by
uninsured persons seeking urgently-needed health care
[sic] in hospital emergency rooms. Our Legislature
recognized... that reducing healthcare coverage for low-
income persons results in increased expenditures for charity
care in hospital emergency rooms. Consequently, as a
practical matter, states can either fund healthcare for the
poor on the "front end" by providing them with some form
of subsidized healthcare coverage, or pay on the "back end"
in increased costs for hospital charity care. That choice may
be driven by a state's current economic situation, e.g.,
whether it can afford to "front load" healthcare costs or
whether it prefers to bear higher costs in the future when its
budget situation may be less dire.93
The court speculated that "this paradigm [might] explain why
Congress left the States some discretion to fund healthcare coverage
for non-qualifying aliens" and that this did not undermine the
uniformity of the policy.94
91. Guaman II, 74 A.3d at 934 (citing Pyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19 (1982)).
92. Guaman II, 74 A.3d at 941.
93. Id. at 941-42 (citation omitted).
94. Id.
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Judge Harris, preferring the approach in cases such as Finch,95
dissented and argued that PRWORA did not constitute a uniform
rule.96 Interestingly, he went on to consider whether the law would
satisfy strict scrutiny.97 The State advanced mainly fiscal and budgetary
justifications which the dissent correctly rejected.98 Judge Harris also
rejected the argument that the exclusion of noncitizens was validated
by PRWORA's statement that "a State that chooses to follow the
Federal classification in determining the eligibility of such aliens for
public assistance shall be considered to have chosen the least restrictive
means available for achieving the compelling governmental interest of
assuring that aliens be self-reliant in accordance with national
immigration policy."99 He argued that:
[I]t is highly doubtful that Congress's instruction to the
courts to find a compelling interest in this particular species
of fiscal motivation would withstand review under a
separation of powers analysis... The Constitution grants
Congress the power to regulate the details of immigration,
not the power to decide when and where its laws are
subject to a particular scope of review. The former power is
reflective of the constitutional recognition that certain
matters requiring political judgments are best left to the
political branches. 100
D. Korab v. Finkol
1. The Scheme at Issue
The case involved non-pregnant citizens, ages nineteen or older,
originating from countries with Compacts of Free Association
(hereinafter "COFA")102 with the United States who lawfully resided
95. Finch 1, 946 N.E.2d 1262.
96. Guaman II, 74 A.3d at 953-54.
97. Id. at 944-58.
98. Id. at 955.
99. Id. at 946.
100. Id. at 957 (citations omitted).
101. Korab v. Fink (Korab IV), 748 F.3d 875 (9th Cir. 2014).
102. 48 U.S.C. § 1901 (1986).
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in Hawai'i (COFA Residents).1 03 Up to 1996, COFA Residents were
entitled to federal Medicaid benefits.10 4 After the enactment of
PRWORA, they were no longer so entitled. 105 However, the State of
Hawai'i decided to continue to provide the same medical benefits to
COFA Residents, using state funds only.10 6 Yet, unlike other states,
Hawai'i did not establish a new legal program, but rather created a
de facto state-funded medical assistance program by continuing to
provide medical assistance benefits to COFA Residents and paying
for those benefits entirely with state funds.10 7 However, in 2010, the
state established a new (and much more limited) Basic Health
Hawai'i (hereinafter "BHH") program "exclusively for COFA
Residents and legal permanent residents who have lived in the
United States for less than five years." 10 8 COFA Residents were
disenrolled from what the district court described as the Old
Programs, and enrolled in BHH.109
2. Equality Analysis
Korab v. Fink was an appeal of the district court's decision in Korab
v. Koller 10 to grant a preliminary injunction after applying strict
scrutiny to the exclusion of the COFA residents."' The Ninth Circuit
vacated this ruling and remanded the case to the lower court.1 12
Circuit Judge McKeown, writing for the court,113 concluded that:
The basic flaw in the [appellants'] proposition is that Korab is
excluded from the more comprehensive Medicaid benefits,
103. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 877.
104. Id.; see also 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (1996).
105. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 878.
106. Id. at 880.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 877.
109. Id.
110. Korab v. Koller (Korab I/), No. 10-00483, 2010 WL 5158883 (D. Haw. Dec. 13,2010).
111. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 877-78.
112. Id. at 888.
113. Judge Bybee stated that he "concur[red] in full in Judge McKeown's thoughtful
opinion for the court." Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 888. However, as we will see, his own
opinion contains views quote contrary to those of Judge McKeown. For the purposes of
this note, Judge McKeown's opinion is taken as a majority opinion and we do not
consider the implications or appropriateness of Judge Bybee's rather disingenuous
approach.
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which include federal funds, as a consequence of
congressional action. Congress has plenary power to
regulate immigration and the conditions on which aliens
remain in the United States, and Congress has authorized
states to do exactly what Hawai'i has done here -determine
the eligibility for, and terms of, state benefits for aliens in the
narrow third category, with regard to whom Congress
expressly gave states limited discretion. Hawai'i has no
constitutional obligation to fill the gap left by Congress's
withdrawal of federal funding for COFA Residents'14
The court expressed some doubt that Korab had shown a
difference in treatment, stating:
At this stage of the proceedings, we harbor serious doubts
that Korab has carried his initial burden to establish a claim
of disparity vis-a-vis the state's actions. Under Medicaid,
citizens and eligible aliens are covered under a plan funded
by both federal and state funds. By contrast, Basic Health
Hawai'i is funded solely by the state. Here, however, Korab
has not claimed that COFA Residents are receiving less per
capita state funding than citizens or qualified aliens. Nor has
Korab offered any evidence that the state's average
expenditures on behalf of COFA Residents in Basic Health
Hawai'i are less than the amount the state contributes for
citizens and qualified aliens eligible for Medicaid. On this
record, Hawai'i "does nothing more than refuse to expend
State monies to restore the Federal funds lost by Congress's
constitutional exercise of its plenary power."115
However, the court decided that it was not necessary to resolve
the issue given that it dismissed the case on other grounds.116
Accordingly, it proceeded on the assumption that there was a
difference in treatment and considered whether strict scrutiny (as
114. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 878.
115. Id. at 886 n.8 (citations omitted). It is interesting that the Korab court makes very
limited reference to its own decision in Pimentel, which could have been relied on to support a
finding of a lack of disparate treatment. For the dissent's criticism of this approach see below.
116. Id. at 887.
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the district court has ruled) or rational basis applied.
117
The Court followed the approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit
in Soskin.118 This Court ruled that:
Considering the Welfare Reform Act as a whole, it
establishes a uniform federal structure for providing welfare
benefits to distinct classes of aliens. The entire benefit
scheme flows from these classifications, and a state's limited
discretion to implement a plan for a specified category of
aliens does not defeat or undermine uniformity. In arguing
to the contrary, the dissent ignores that 'a state's exercise of
discretion can also effectuate national policy."' 19
The court concluded that "Hawai'i's discretionary decision to
deny coverage to COFA Residents effectuates Congress's uniform
national policy on the treatment of aliens in the welfare context."
120
The "logical corollary" 121 to the Congressional policy was that "where
the federal program is constitutional, as it is here, states cannot be
forced to replace the federal funding Congress has removed."
122
In a lengthy concurring opinion, Judge Bybee argued for
the adoption of a preemption-based approach to alienage
classifications, rather than the application of equal protection
analysis. 23 This approach is not considered in detail here because it
does not represent the law as it currently stands and the argument is
fundamentally flawed.124 Litigants are entitled to argue that a
particular law is preempted or in breach of the equal protection
guarantee. Of course, no issue of preemption arose in Korab IV,125
and thus no such argument was advanced.126 Judge Bybee's
argument is not for a choice between preemption and equal
protection analysis, but rather for not applying equal protection in
117. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 887.
118. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255.
119. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 884.
120. Id. at 885.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 886.
123. Id. at 896 (Bybee, J., concurring).
124. Id. at 882.
125. Id. at 875.
126. Id. at 888 n.11.
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relation to immigration issues.127 But, as Judge Bybee acknowledged
"[flor over a century, the [United States] Supreme Court has
recognized that aliens are 'persons' entitled to the protection of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments." 128
The preemption approach would involve denying immigrants
the right to equal protection. Judge Bybee denies this by stating that:
Nothing I have said here should diminish in any way the
fact that aliens are "persons" entitled to the protection of
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process Clause -
including its equal protection component-of the Fifth
Amendment. But the tension evident in the Court's post-
Graham cases is a consequence of the Court's efforts to
reconcile the Equal Protection Clause with a recognition
that there are common law and constitutional distinctions
between the rights of citizens and the rights of aliens
visiting or residing in the United States.129
If this means anything, it can only imply a "separate but equal"
protection guarantee for noncitizens which would also appear to
conflict with long established precedent.
In his relatively brief comments on the law as it stands, Judge
Bybee's concurrence claims that "it is unlikely that Hawai'i's scheme
can muster constitutional scrutiny."'130 Following Graham,131 he
argued that the district court was correct to apply strict scrutiny.132
The budgetary reasons for which the law was adopted had never been
accepted as justifying discrimination subject to heightened judicial
scrutiny.133 The alternative argument that Hawai'i was following a
127. As Judge McKeown noted, "Judge Bybee's preemption analysis-that the
Hawai'i welfare program is not expressly or impliedly preempted nor does it violate
Congress's dormant immigration power-sidesteps the ultimate constitutional question
raised by Korab and briefed by both parties: namely, whether Hawai'i's action violates
the Equal Protection Clause." Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 888 n.11.
128. Id. at 889 (Bybee, J., concurring) (citing Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228,
237 (1896); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356,369 (1886); Graham, 403 U.S. at 371).
129. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 901 n.8 (Bybee, J., concurring).
130. Id. at 900 (Bybee, J., concurring).
131. 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
132. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 910 (Bybee, J., concurring).
133. Id. at 875.
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"compelling government interest"134 was, he opined, "not likely a
sufficient justification."135 In conclusion, Judge Bybee took the view
that "if we looked exclusively to equal protection principles, I think
it is likely that Hawai'i's law would fall."1 36
Thus, this concurring opinion appeared rather to agree with
Judge Clifton's dissent.137 Judge Clifton first criticized the majority's
suggestion that Plaintiffs failed to establish a disparity in
treatment.138 He argued that this was incorrect, first, because it
treated:
Medicaid as if it consisted of two separate programs, one
federal and one state, because the program is partially
funded by the federal government. But that is not how
Medicaid actually works. In Hawai'i, as in most states, there
is a single plan, administered by the state. The federal
government reimburses the state for a significant portion of
the cost, and the plan must comply with federal
requirements, but it is a state plan .... Beneficiaries are not
covered by two separate federal and state plans, but rather
by one single plan administered by the state.13
9
Second, and "more importantly," he argued that the majority
approach
[Riuns afoul of bedrock equal protection doctrine dating
back at least to Brown v. Board of Education.140 The majority
opinion would allow a state to treat a class of aliens
differently as long as the state's financial outlay for
Plaintiffs and other members of the suspect class is the
same, on a per capita basis, as the state's expenditures for
134. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 900 (Bybee, J., concurring).
135. Id. at 901 (Bybee, J., concurring) (stating that the Supreme Court had "held that,
whatever reasons the federal government may offer for its own discrimination policy, the
states cannot rely on that same justification. The states must supply their own sovereign
reasons and cannot cite the reasons of a coordinate government" (citing City of
Richmond v. J.A. Corson Co., 488 U.S. 469,504 (1989))).
136. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 901 (Bybee, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 903 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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the rest of the population. But that does not change the fact
that Hawai'i has treated aliens differently by placing COFA
Residents in a program with reduced benefits. That action
constitutes disparate treatment in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause. The disparate treatment is not
immunized because the per capita expenditures might be
the same. "Separate but equal" is not permitted.
141
Turning to the appropriate level of scrutiny, the dissent argued
that it was Hawai'i and not the federal government that had made
the decision to differentiate and, therefore, strict scrutiny applied.
1 42
Similar to the dissent in Guaman I1,143 Judge Clifton did not accept
that PROWRA's discretion constituted a "uniform rule" thereby
avoiding strict scrutiny. 44
III. A Framework for Equal Protection Analysis
As we have seen, the courts have come to radically different
conclusions as to the compatibility of excluding legal immigrants
from healthcare and welfare programs. Such conclusions range from
findings that no disparity in treatment occurred; 145 to application of
rational basis review upholding the exclusion; 46 to application of
strict scrutiny finding exclusion to be unconstitutional. 47 This
mirrors the divided jurisprudence in earlier cases.
48
A. Differences in Scheme Structure
There are factual differences between the schemes considered in
these as well as earlier cases. To date, cases where separate programs
were established 49 are more likely to be upheld than cases that resulted
141. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 903 (Clifton, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 904.
143. Guaman v. Velez (Guaman I), 74 A.3d 931 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2011).
144. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 908 (Clifton, J., dissenting). He appeared to assume that
the law would not satisfy strict scrutiny, presumably on the basis of the district court's
decision in that case but did not specifically discuss the issues.
145. See Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 662; Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1110.
146. See Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 878 Guaman II, 74 A.3d at 944.
147. See Finch 1, 946 N.E.2d at 1280.
148. See supra note 1.
149. See Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 642; Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1107.
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in the exclusion of immigrants from a uniform program.
150
Nonetheless, and although courts on both sides of the divide have
attempted to distinguish alternative approaches on their facts, it is
submitted that different administrative structures are not, and should
not necessarily be determinative of the outcome. For example, the court
in Guaman upheld the exclusion of immigrants from a uniform
scheme.151 However, it is difficult to determine whether the "Old
Programs" for COFA Residents in Korab should be classified as the
continuation of a uniform scheme (but with state funding only) or the
administrative establishment of a new immigrant-only scheme. 152 As a
matter of principle, it seems undesirable that the outcome of such
challenges should be determined by whether a state chose to keep
immigrants with legal status within a uniform scheme (at least for a
period of time) or established a separate immigrant-only scheme. After
all, if it is correct that states were not required to establish a separate
scheme and, therefore, such scheme should now only be subject to
rational basis review (if it is subject to review at all), it should be equally
correct that states did not have to keep immigrants in their uniform
schemes. If this is the case, why should states now be strictly
scrutinized for excluding them?
B. Equal Protection Analysis
Much of the difficulty of these cases stems from the
dichotomous standard applied to immigration status distinctions by
the Supreme Court, whereby the states are reviewed strictly, but
great deference is shown to the federal government. Coupled with
the fact that the highest court has yet to clarify the standard for
reviewing state decisions influenced but not mandated by federal
law, the root of the difficulty amongst these cases is inherently
clear.153 However, it is also submitted that part of the difficulty with
150. See Finch I, 946 N.E.2d at 1280.
151. See Guaman 1, 23 A.3d. at 469.
152. This is not to say that the different structures of state-federal cooperation are
irrelevant. Clearly the Food Stamp Act provides for a program in which the federal role
is more dominant than in Medicaid.
153. Of course, behind this issue lies one of the fundamental weaknesses in United
States equality jurisprudence, i.e. the dichotomous approach to scrutiny and the Court's
failure to utilize the intermediate standard of review (other than in an ad hoc and
unacknowledged manner). Of course, calls for changes in this approach have gone
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the issue is that the courts have not generally applied the (rather
clear) framework for equal protection analysis developed by the
United States Supreme Court, or else they have not done so
correctly. 154 As set out in Part L.A of this Article, to prevail on an
equal protection claim, a plaintiff first must establish that the State is
affording disparate treatment to similarly situated groups of
individuals. Second, where different treatment is demonstrated, the
court must examine whether this treatment is consistent with a
governmental interest. This analysis will either involve rational
basis review where federal action is involved or strict scrutiny where
state action is implicated.
C. Similarly Situated?
First, we must ask whether immigrants with legal status are
similarly situated to citizens and other longer term resident
immigrants covered by the program in question. It is one of the basic
principles of Aristotelian equality that like should be treated alike.
Although this issue is occasionally conflated with the question of
different treatment, it does not appear to be specifically addressed by
the recent court decisions. However, it would be difficult to argue
that the immigrants with legal status are not similarly situated for the
purpose of such actions. In these cases, the plaintiffs are legal
residents of the United States of America and, by definition, meet the
other need-based criteria for qualification. The only distinguishing
factor for such plaintiffs is a lack of citizenship or duration of legal
residence, and this is precisely the issue being challenged. To hold
that these immigrants are not similarly situated would be equivalent
to ruling that women are not similarly situated to men in a gender-
based challenge.1 55
unheeded and suggestions that the Court might be explicitly developing a 'Third Strand'
of review look to be unfounded: See Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal
Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature of Rights and Classes, 99 U.
ILL. L. REV. 1209 (1999).
154. See supra Part I.
155. Though indeed, such an approach is not entirely absent from US equal
protection jurisprudence. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
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The Canadian Supreme Court adopted a more flexible approach
to equality jurisprudence holding that:
[A] formal analysis based on comparison between the
claimant group and a 'similarly situated' group, does not
assure a result that captures the wrong to which s. 15(1) [the
equal protection clause of the Canadian Charter of Rights]
is directed -the elimination from the law of measures that
impose or perpetuate substantial inequality. What is
required is not formal comparison with a
selected mirror comparator group, but an approach that
looks at the full context, including the situation of the
claimant group and whether the impact of the impugned
law is to perpetuate disadvantage or negative stereotypes
about that group.156
However, in the case of immigrants with legal status, a more
contextual approach is not even required as it is clear that they are
similarly situated to those covered by the programs at issue.
D. Different Treatment?
The issue of differential treatment raises more serious issues. Are
the plaintiffs being treated differently by the state?157 Again courts
have tended to conflate questions of difference in treatment and the
author of that treatment. It is submitted that immigrants with legal
status who are, for example, excluded from general healthcare
schemes and who are only entitled to reduced (if any) benefits are
clearly treated differently. If the program were purely a federal one
(or one administered only by a state), then the state would not be
responsible. But only the food benefit program at issue in Pimentel
comes close and, even here, participation by the state is voluntary.158
In the case of voluntary programs, the state could opt out of
participation when faced with different treatment of immigrants or it
156. Withler v. Canada (Attorney Gen.), [2011] S.C.R. 396, para. 40 (Can.).
157. If they are being treated differently by the federal government, then the Fifth
Amendment (rather than the Fourteenth) is engaged and, more importantly, the
difference in treatment is subject only to rational basis review.
158. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1109.
[Vol. 12
Winter 2015] IMMIGRANT ACCESS TO HEALTHCARE AND WELFARE BENEFITS 49
could opt to provide state-funded benefits to immigrants.159
However, where a state opts to participate in a federal program and
provides different treatment to immigrants as opposed to citizens, it is
the state that is proximately responsible for the difference in
treatment. 60 Whether this difference is justified by federal policies is
a question to be answered at a later stage in the analysis.
161
E. On What Ground?
Assuming, as explained and argued above, that there is
different treatment, some courts concluded that this is based on
eligibility for federal benefits rather than immigration status.162 This
argument is unsustainable given the federal eligibility requirement,
which clearly impacts the plaintiffs based on their status. It might
alternatively be argued that the difference in treatment is based on
length of residency, as some immigrants are eligible for benefits.
163
However, the length of residence requirement only applies to
immigrants and discrimination within a certain category of
immigrants, and is still discrimination on the basis of immigration
status.164 Therefore, the different treatment at issue is based on
immigration status, as some courts have found.
65
F. Strict or Rational Scrutiny?
Assuming, as this Article has argued, that the difference in
treatment is based on immigration status, Supreme Court precedent
suggests strict scrutiny would apply unless PRWORA applies a
159. Pimentel, 670 F.3d at 1110.
160. Id. at 1099.
161. However, one issue which has yet to be considered by the courts is what
different treatment involves. Obviously, from the point of view of the plaintiffs, different
treatment involves not having access to the same range of benefits which are available to
citizens. However, because of federal-state co-funding, it costs much more for a state to
provide benefits to a non-eligible immigrant than it does to provide the same benefits to
a person eligible for federal benefits. The potential argument that equal treatment is
being provided where a state is spending a broadly equivalent amount on benefits for
both citizens and noncitizens does not yet appear to have received detailed consideration
by the courts.
162. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 662.
163. Comm'r of Transitional Assistance, 773 N.E.2d 404.
164. Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1,12 (1977).
165. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d at 662.
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uniform rule for states to follow. However, the Ninth and Tenth
Circuits in Korab and Soskin have broadened the uniform rule
approach to allow rational basis review where the rule is not
inconsistent with a uniform approach.
1 66
It is difficult to disagree with the Superior Court of New Jersey's
holding in Guaman I that the search for a uniform rule is "an elusive,
and ultimately unsatisfying, exercise." 167 The basis for the "uniform
rule" doctrine is simply a footnote in Plyler and the Supreme Court
has certainly not fleshed out what a uniform rule might consist of
(nor its rationale).168 The reference to a "uniform rule" presumably
derives from the reference to a "uniform rule of naturalization" in
the United States Constitution.169 One can see that where Congress
has mandated a particular action in the immigration field (which is
subject to deferential review), states should not have to satisfy strict
scrutiny in implementing that required action. However, while
access to welfare benefits is clearly related to issues concerning
immigration and naturalization, the policy issues underlying them
are quite different. While it makes sense to have a uniform rule as to
naturalization, it is not necessarily good policy for Congress to
require a uniform rule concerning welfare given the differential
impact of immigration on states, their different abilities to meet the
needs of immigrants, and their different policy options. Indeed, it is
arguable that the flexible approach chosen by Congress in PRWORA
is a much better policy option than a uniform rule.170
Most courts which have considered the issue have concluded
that PRWORA does not set out a uniform rule as it allows state
discretion as to whether benefits should be granted. 17' Indeed none
of the courts in the recent cases held that PRWORA provides a
166. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 875; Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255.
167. Guaman 1, 23 A.3d at 466.
168. Guaman 1, 23 A.3d at 466 (citing Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n. 19).
169. U.S. CONST. art. I. § 8, cl.4 (granting the United States Congress the power to
establish a uniform rule of naturalization).
170. For a discussion see Price, supra note 31; Roger C. Hartley, Congressional
Devolution of Immigration Policymaking: A Separation of Powers Critique, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L.
& PUB. POL'Y 93 (2007). Nor is the purpose of the uniformity requirement in the
Naturalization Clause undermined by the PRWORA's grant of discretion to the States
with respect to qualifications for Medicaid. See Soskin 353 F.3d at 1257.
171. See Aliessa ex. rel. Fayad, 754 N.E.2d at 1098; Ehrlich, 908 A.2d at 1241;
Pimentel, 670 F.3d 1096; Finch I, 946 N.E.2d at 1277; Korab v. Koller (Korab 1), No. 10-00483,
2010 WL 4688824 at *24; Unthaksinkun, 2011 WL 4502050.
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uniform rule in relation to Medicaid. Although it is often presented
as a case in which the "uniform rule" doctrine was applied, a close
reading of Soskin suggests that the Third Circuit made its ruling on
the basis that the laws in question "reflect[ed] national policy that
Congress has the constitutional power to enact" and were not
inconsistent with a uniform rule of naturalization. 172 As we have
seen, this nuanced approach was followed by the majority in Korab
and Guaman. This is indeed a plausible legal interpretation and one
that avoids the rigidity of the uniform rule doctrine. It does not,
however, as yet find confirmation in a ruling of the Supreme Court.
To conclude on this point, it is difficult to see that PRWORA can
be defended as applying a uniform rule.173 Indeed, there may be good
policy arguments for the courts to move away from the "uniform
rule" doctrine as it concerns access to welfare benefits, and the Soskin
and Korab approach of applying deferential scrutiny where the law at
issue reflects Congressional policy in an area in which Congress has
plenary powers is an attractive one. The recent decisions in Korab and
Guaman certainly provide some additional jurisprudential support for
this approach. However, it is unclear at this time whether this
approach (yet) represents good law. If one takes the view that it does
not, then strict scrutiny must apply.
G. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Finally, let us consider the application of strict scrutiny. It is a
well know precept that strict scrutiny is strict in principle but "fatal in
fact" and such has been proven in the cases considered here, which
applied heightened scrutiny (as in Finch).174  However, more
generally, the United States Supreme Court has stated on a number of
occasions that strict scrutiny should not be fatal.' 75 Indeed, empirical
studies have indicated that strict scrutiny is not fatal in a significant
172. Soskin, 353 F.3d at 1255.
173. See Judge Clifton's comments in Korab IV: "A federal 'direction' that points in
two opposite ways is not a direction." 748 F.3d at 909. In Pimentel, the Ninth Circuit
stated that "the Welfare Reform Act did not establish a uniform rule with respect to state
welfare programs." 670 F.3d at 1109.
174. Finch v. Commonwealth Health Ins. Connector Auth. (Finch I), 959 N.E.2d 970,
984 (Mass. 2012).
175. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995); Johnson v.
California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005).
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percentage of cases at all federal levels.176
Nonetheless, as discussed in Part II.B., in Finch (the only recent
court to apply strict scrutiny in a detailed manner) the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that strict scrutiny was not
satisfied for two reasons. 77 First, the court found that exclusively
fiscal concerns motivated the legislative enactment. 78 Second, the
court found that the Commonwealth had not shown that legislation
was narrowly tailored to further a compelling interest.179 However,
these findings are open to some criticism (although the outcome may
have been correct on the facts).
First, as to the legislative purpose, the Attorney General had
argued that the amendment advanced the compelling interest of
furthering the national immigration policies expressed by Congress in
PRWORA.180 Even by the court's own account there are several
references in the legislative record to PRWORA. 181 Now the court may
indeed be correct that the legislature was driven to adopt these
measures for primarily budgetary reasons, but in doing so, it was still
adopting Congressional policy. Indeed one might assume that
PRWORA was deliberately designed to provide a financial incentive for
states to comply with its "statements concerning national policy with
respect to welfare and immigration." 82 While the court is correct to
limit its inquiry to the actual (rather than hypothetical) rationale for the
legislation, the fact remains that purpose of the Massachusetts legislature
was to bring state law into line with Congressional policy. 183 Surely its
precise motive for doing so (whether it be budgetary pressure or a firm
belief in the merits of self-sufficiency) is irrelevant.
As we have seen, PRWORA specifically provides that: "It is a
compelling government interest to enact new rules for eligibility [for
public assistance] ... in order to assure that aliens be self-reliant in
accordance with national immigration policy." 184 However, the
176. Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict
Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793 (2006). See also Ozan 0. Varol, Strict in
Theory, But Accommodating in Fact?, 75 Mo. L. REV. 1244 (2010).
177. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d at 973.
178. Id. at 973-74.
179. Id. at 974.
180. Id. at 973.
181. Id. at 976-79.
182. 8 U.S.C. § 1601 (1996).
183. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d at 976.
184. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(5) (1996).
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Massachusetts court took a rather fatal approach to its application of
strict scrutiny. First, it declined to reach the question whether
national immigration policy can ever serve as a compelling interest
for the purposes of strict scrutiny.18 5 Given the importance attached
by the Supreme Court to Congressional authority in this area and
the importance given by Congress to immigration policy (and
PRWORA), it is difficult to see how or why national immigration
policy should not constitute a compelling interest.1
8 6
Second, the court suggested that strict scrutiny would apply to
the State's application of national policy as set out in PRWORA.18 7
Again, it is submitted that given Congress' plenary authority in this
area and the fact that these policy statements are set out in national
legislation, they are subject only to rational review; and the fact that
the State applies them does not make them subject to strict
scrutiny.188 Massachusetts cannot be expected to investigate whether
or not the national policy statements are empirically correct l8 9
However, the court's finding that strict scrutiny was not satisfied
may be justified on procedural grounds. Narrow tailoring requires
"serious, good faith consideration" of "workable" nondiscriminatory
alternatives that will achieve the legislature's goals. 90 It is not clear
from the record that the legislature ever gave such consideration to
alternative approaches, nor would it seem likely that strict scrutiny
would have been satisfied in Korab IV.
185. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d at 979 (claiming that "no published judicial opinion has
ever endorsed national immigration policy as a compelling State interest for the purposes
of strict scrutiny.").
186. Korab IV, 748 F.3d at 901 (Bybee, J., concurring) (citing J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
at 504 in support of his opinion that states may not rely on the federal government
rationale behind their policy choices and following federal policy was not a "compelling
government [state] interest").
187. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d at 980 (stating "there was no legislative inquiry concerning
the self-sufficiency of legal immigrants in Massachusetts. Nor did the Legislature ever
evaluate whether withholding state subsidies for health insurance from legal immigrants
is narrowly tailored to promote such self-sufficiency").
188. Id. at 979-80.
189. Indeed the State's analogy to race-based classifications in cooperative federal-
state transportation contracting appears correct. Here, three courts of appeals, applying
strict scrutiny, unanimously held that the states were entitled to rely on the compelling
interest articulated by Congress, i.e. remedying past discrimination: N. Contracting, Inc.
v. Illinois, 473 F.3d 715 (7th Cir. 2007); W. States Paving Co. Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of
Transp., 407 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2005); Sherbrooke Turf, Inc. v. Minnesota Dep't of
Transp., 345 F.3d 964 (8th Cir. 2003).
190. Finch II, 959 N.E.2d at 979 (citing Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 339 (2003)).
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It should be noted that PRWORA specifically provides that "a
State that chooses to follow the federal classification in determining
the eligibility of such aliens for public assistance shall be considered
to have chosen the least restrictive means available for achieving the
compelling governmental interest of assuring that aliens be self-
reliant in accordance with national immigration policy." 191
However, it seems unlikely that the courts would accept this
attempt to insulate state choices from the usual level of heightened
scrutiny. Judge Harris in Guaman II (albeit in a dissenting judgment)
specifically rejected this approach, but even the majority in that case
conceded that Congress' attempt was "insensitive to separation-of-
powers concerns." 192
Conclusion
We have seen that the issue of the compatibility of the exclusion
of legal immigrants, from access to general healthcare and welfare
benefits with the equal protection guarantee, has led to inconsistency
amongst state and federal courts. While the only courts of appeals to
consider the issue to date have upheld the laws challenged, 193 the
courts arrived at this outcome for somewhat different reasons, while
lower courts have come to the opposite conclusion. 194 Meanwhile,
there has been a major difference of opinion amongst state courts as
to the constitutionality of such laws.195 This Article has argued that
factual differences are insufficient to explain the different outcomes,
and that the cases to date reflect an undesirable lack of clarity about
the correct legal approach. This is, in part, due to either a failure by
the courts to apply a clear equal protection framework to their
analysis or their incorrect application of this framework. 96 The
difficulties arise in large part because of the dichotomous legal
standards which apply to federal (rational-basis review) as opposed
to state (strict scrutiny) and the feeling of some courts that while
states are, in effect, applying a federal "mandate," that mandate as
191. 8 U.S.C. § 1601(7) (1996).
192. Guaman II, 74 A.3d at 941 (Harris, J., dissenting).
193. Soskin, 353 F.3d 1242; Pimentel, 670 F.3d 1096; Korab IV, 748 F.3d 875; Bruns, 750 F.3d 61.
194. Unthaksinkun, 2011 WL 4502050.
195. Compare Hong Pham, 16 A.3d 635; Finch II, 959 N.E.2d 970; and Guaman 1, 23
A.3d 451.
196. See Hong Pham, 16 A.3d 635; see also Pimentel, 670 F.3d 1096; Bruns, 750 F.3d 61.
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expressed in PRWORA is insufficiently precise to satisfy the
"uniform rule" test.
Many judges believe that it cannot be correct that states should be
judged strictly for continuing to provide benefits to immigrants after
PRWORA and then implementing the approach that they were
encouraged to adopt by Congress by withdrawing these benefits.
197
However, in order to avoid applying strict scrutiny with its possibly
fatal impact on state action, some courts, such as the Connecticut
Supreme Court in Hong Pham'98 and the First Circuit in Bruns,199 are
incorrectly applying equal protection analysis to hold that no
difference in treatment has occurred. This may create a dangerous
precedent in other areas of equal protection jurisprudence. If we
adopt the view that immigrants who are denied access to health or
welfare benefits, or who are provided with significantly limited
benefits, are, in fact, treated differently, and if we assume that
PRWORA does not create a uniform rule, what options are open to
those judges who intuitively feel that states should not be penalized
for applying the wishes of Congress?
The first is to adopt the Soskin 200 and Korab201 approach of
broadening the uniform rule doctrine so as to apply rational basis
review where the laws in question "reflect national policy that
Congress has the constitutional power to enact" and are consistent with
a uniform rule of naturalization.2 2 However, this does disadvantage
197. Even Judge Clifton acknowledged in his dissent that "there is something
paradoxical and more than a little unfair in my conclusion that the State of Hawai'i has
discriminated against COFA Residents. The state responded to an option given to it by
Congress, albeit an option that I don't think Congress had the power to give. Hawai'i
provided full Medicaid benefits to COFA Residents for many years, entirely out of its
own treasury, because the federal government declined to bear any part of that cost.
Rather than terminate benefits completely in 2010, Hawai'i offered the BHH program to
COFA Residents, again from its own pocket. The right of COFA Residents to come to
Hawai'i in the first place derives from the Compacts of Free Association that were
negotiated and entered into by the federal government. That a disproportionate share of
COFA Residents, from Pacific island nations, come to Hawai'i as compared to the other
forty-nine states is hardly a surprise, given basic geography. The decision by the state
not to keep paying the full expense of Medicaid benefits for those aliens is not really a
surprise, either. In a larger sense, it is the federal government, not the State of Hawai'i
that should be deemed responsible." Korab IV, at 909.
198. Hong Pham, 16 A.3d 635.
199. Bruns, 750 F.3d 61.
200. Soskin, 353 F.3d 1242.
201. Korab IV, 748 F.3d 875.
202. Soskin, 353 F.3d 1242; followed in Guaman 1, 23 A.3d 451.
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plaintiffs in that almost any and all such laws will be upheld.
An alternative approach more favorable to plaintiffs would be
accept that PRWORA does not apply a uniform rule and that
therefore, strict scrutiny applies for the reasons set out in Graham.203
However, recognizing that strict scrutiny need not be fatal, courts
should allow states to rely on following national immigration policy
as a compelling state interest, and thus focus on whether the state
can show that the approach adopted (and the procedures adopted to
reach that outcome) represent "the least restrictive means available."
203. See supra Part I.A.
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